When A Customer Is Tricked Into Approving A Payment Who Pays?
A CUSTOMER SHARED HER SCREEN WITH A FRAUDSTER. THE BANK WAS ORDERED TO REFUND HER
In 2024, a woman in Delhi received a call from a fraudster and allegedly shared her phone screen. The next morning, two transfers followed: ₹5 lakh and ₹44,488, authenticated with her PINs and OTPs. The bank argued that the payments were authenticated and the loss was hers. On October 28, a Delhi consumer commission disagreed. An OTP proves that the correct code was entered, not that the customer understood or intended the payment. The commission acknowledged that screen-sharing could amount to negligence, but found that the bank had not established that the entire loss was her responsibility. It also found that the bank had not produced sufficient device, IP address, beneficiary and audit records. The bank was ordered to refund ₹4,14,488, with interest and compensation. Authentication alone is not proof of consent. Banks need records to establish what happened and who was responsible.
FROM JANUARY 1, BANKS MUST ESTABLISH WHEN A CUSTOMER IS LIABLE
New directions from the RBI, issued in June, apply to digital payments made on or after January 1, 2027. They extend fraud protection to payments customers make after being deceived or coerced, not just transactions they never initiated. The burden of proving customer liability rests with the bank. Banks must examine complaints and determine liability within 45 days for domestic transactions and 60 days for cross-border transactions. This makes the bank’s investigation and transaction records central to deciding who bears the loss.
REPORT A THIRD PARTY BREACH WITHIN FIVE DAYS AND THE CUSTOMER HAS ZERO LIABILITY
Under the new rules, customers who report a third-party breach within five calendar days have zero liability, and the transaction must be reversed. A third-party breach is one where neither the customer nor the bank is at fault. After five days, liability is determined under the bank’s own policy. Other cases depend on where the fault lies. Banks must also send instant SMS alerts for digital transactions above ₹500. For credit card complaints, they must provide temporary credit within five days. Timely alerts matter: customers cannot report transactions they do not know have occurred.
THE SUPREME COURT WANTS EARLY HOLDS ON SUSPECT ACCOUNTS AND BANKS TO PAY WHEN THEY MISS THEM
At an October 29 hearing on “digital arrest” scams, where fraudsters impersonate police officers and pressure victims into transferring money, the Supreme Court pressed the RBI to finalize its draft KYC rules. The Attorney General told the Court the rules would be notified by November 30 and take effect by December 31. The draft would allow banks to temporarily hold outgoing payments from suspected mule accounts (accounts used to receive and pass on stolen money) for up to 60 days unless police direct otherwise. Account holders would have 20 days to explain the transactions. The Court also said banks should compensate victims, at least for the amount lost, where failures in due diligence enabled the fraud. It noted that bank employees were involved in some scams. The Court is yet to issue further orders. A temporary hold can prevent further loss, but only if the bank identifies the suspect account in time.
CRIMINALS USED LENDER’S OWN CREDENTIALS TO MOVE MONEY. MANY CHECKS WERE BYPASSED.
Not all fraud involves a customer. On October 9, India’s national cyber agency, CERT-In, warned of attacks on lenders, fintechs and wallet operators. Criminals stole the credentials these firms use to move money, then initiated transfers through their own pre-approved systems. Because the requests came from trusted systems, they bypassed many application-level checks. CERT-In noted the likely use of AI-assisted tools and warned that the time between breaking in and stealing funds is shrinking. Separately, a media report on October 29, estimated that smaller non-bank lenders had lost about ₹300 crore to cyberattacks in recent months. With no customer to blame, the loss fell on the lenders themselves. A valid credential establishes access, not whether a transaction is legitimate.